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Case No. 20150565-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plain tiff!Appellee,

v.
TIIvIOTHY JOSEPH ADAivIS,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for production of a controlled
substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West
Supp. 2012).

INTRODUCTION
Defendant is a 65-year-old man in poor health, who lives alone in
rural Big Water, Utah, and calls his mother almost daily. When Defendant's
mother had not heard from Defendant in several days and could not reach
him, she became worried and called police to do a welfare check.
Defendant's mother explained to the police that her son may need medical
assistance.
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At Defendant's house, the responding officer saw a light on,
suggesting that someone was home, but no one answered the officer's
knocks, and neighbors reported not seeing Defendant for several days. The
officer believed that Defendant was inside the home and needed help.
The officer entered Defendant's home under the emergency aid
doctrine-an exception to the Fourth Amend1nent-that allows warrantless
entry if an officer has an objectively reasonable basis to believe that a person
within the home is in need of medical aid. The officer walked through the
home looking for Defendant but instead of finding Defendant, found his
marijuana plants. Police subsequently obtained a search warrant for
Defendant's property and seized the drugs and other drug-related evidence.
Defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the
officer's warrantless entry into his home violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. When the trial court denied his motion, Defendant entered a
conditional plea, preserving his right to appeal the h·ial court's ruling.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the h·ial court correctly rule that the warrantless search of
Defendant's house was lawful under the emergency aid doch·ine?
Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is a

mixed question of fact and law. The factual findings underlying a h·ial

-2-
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court's ruling are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,
,Ill, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions, including its

application of the legal standard to the facts, are reviewed non-deferentially
for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 115, 103 P.3d 699.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affinnation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
A. Summary of facts.

Defendant's mother was worried. R356:34, 36. Defendant, a 65-yearold-man in poor health living alone in rural Big Water, Utah, called her" on
an almost daily basis." R356:34-35. But she had not heard frmn him in four
days and could not reach hin1. R357:15-17. So, she called police to do a
welfare check. R357:15-17; R356:24-25.

1

The pleadings section of the record is in reverse order. However,
citations are given in linear order, for ease of reading. The facts are
prin1arily taken fron1 the trial court's n1emorandu1n decision, R313-318, the
testimony from the suppression hearing, R357, and evidence presented at
the preliminary hearing, R356.

-3-
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Big Water's marshal assigned Deputy Robert M. Johnson, who had
experience responding to similar welfare check calls, to respond. R356:25,
34-35.

Deputy Jolmson learned from dispatch that Defendant's mother

requested the welfare check because Defendant was in poor health and she
had not heard from him in several days. R356:34-35. In the past when
Deputy Johnson responded to similar calls, he found individuals in their
home either incapacitated or dead. R356:47. Given the information provided
by Defendant's mother and his experience with welfare checks, Deputy
Johnson's only concern was that Defendant may be inside his home
unconscious or dead. R356:47; R357:16, 20-21.
It was already dark outside when Deputy Jolmson arrived at
Defendant's home- a single wide trailer without a driveway or garage
surrounded by a chain link fence. R356:35; R64. Deputy Jolmson had only
"vague" information about what type of car Defendant drove. R356:42-43.
The marshal had told Deputy Johnson that he thought Defendant drove a
pick-up truck and a motorcycle, but "he wasn't real sure." R356:42-43.
Regardless, Deputy Johnson did not remember any vehicles at Defendant's
house that night. R356:39, 42-43; R357:13-14.
Deputy Johnson noticed a light on in the living room. R357:12. He
also noticed a window in the living room slightly open with an electrical

-4-
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cord coming out of it. R356:36-37. And he noticed a light on in the crawl
space under the trailer. R357:12-13.
Deputy Jolu1son "knocked on the door" and "hollered for"
Defendant. R356:35. When Defendant did not answer, Deputy Johnson
yelled for Defendant through the open window and "ma[de] a racket on the
side of the trailer." R.356:36-37. Deputy Johnson also tried to look into the
house, but he could not see much. R356:36; R357:12. From the little he could
see, he did not see any problems-no sign of forced entry into the home, no
sign of a struggle- but given the medical nature of Defendant's mother's
concern, Deputy Jolmson did not expect to see those things either. R356:42,

47; R357:12-13.
Deputy Johnson continued his search for Defendant around the
property. R356:35.

Deputy Johnson found a ladder leaning against the

house and used it to look on the roof, but he only found some rusty tools
next to the air conditioner. R356:36; R357:13. He also looked in the crawl
space, where a light was on, and found tools and evidence of repair work,
but did not find Defendant. R356:35, 38, 45. Deputy Johnson spoke to the
neighbors, who reported that they had not seen Defendant for "two to three
days." R356:36.

-5-
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Deputy Johnson then called Defendant's mother to let her know that
he had not found Defendant. R356:36. Deputy Johnson asked Defendant's
mother if she wanted him to look inside the house. R356:36. Defendant's
mother said, "yes, please, whatever means possible. I just need to know he's
okay." R356:36; R357:20.
Deputy Johnson entered Defendant's home through the open
window, which led him into the living room-the one room in the house
with a light on. R356:36, R147. Almost immediately, in plain view, Deputy
Johnson saw a grow light and several marijuana plants in different stages of
cultivation. R356:46, Exhibits 3-5, R64, 128, 147. Deputy Johnson took photos
of the marijuana plants, and then searched the rest of the house in places
where Defendant might be. R356:46-47, R317, Exhibits 3-5. When Deputy
Johnson did not find Defendant, he left. R317, R147.
Both Deputy Johnson and the marshal were then out of town for a
few days for training. R357:26. When the marshal returned, he went to
Defendant's house "as soon as [he] could" to check on Defendant. R357:26.
The marshal saw Defendant in his yard and "could tell that he was okay."
R357:26.

The marshal then shifted his priorities from Defendant's welfare to
Defendant's crimes. R357:26. Later that day, the marshal obtained a search

-6-
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warrant for the marijuana plants inside of Defendant's house. R357:26-27,
R64.

When Deputy Johnson and the marshal arrived to execute the
warrant, they found Defendant loading marijuana plants in his pickup truck
and texting on his cellphone. R357:8; R316. The officers asked Defendant if
he still had plants inside his house, and Defendant replied "[t]here might be
one. I've got rid of most of them." R356:48.
Officers found six marijuana plants inside of Defendant's trailer.
R356:14-16. They also found industrial grow lights, potting soil, planting

implements, two baggies of marijuana, a plastic baggie with buds, a platter
of chopped marijuana, a joint, rolling papers, a grinder with marijuana
residue, a rifle, and a bong. R356:14. Based on the evidence, the officers
obtained a second search warrant for Defendant's rifle and cellphone. R6162.

When asked why he was growing marijuana, Defendant responded "I
just wan[t] to retire and smoke dope." R356:18.

B.

Summary of proceedings.
Defendant was charged with two second degree felonies, production

of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute; two third degree felonies, obstruction of justice, and

-7-
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possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person; and one class A
misdemeanor, possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone. R4-6.
After a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over as charged. R53-56.
Motion to Suppress. Defendant moved to suppress the fruits of the

officers' search of his trailer and to quash the search warrants, arguing that
no exigent circumstances allowed Deputy Johnson to make his initial
warrantless entry into Defendant's home. R70-77, 96-132.
Trial Court's Ruling. After extensive briefing, and both a preliminary

hearing and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's
motion and entered its findings of facts and conclusions of law in a
Memorandum Decision. R70-77, 96-132, 137-149, 159-268, 313-318, 356, 357.
The court ruled that Deputy Johnson's initial warrantless entry into
Defendant's home was reasonable under the emergency aid exception to the
Fourth Amendment. R313-314. In support, the court found that Defendant's
mother had informed Deputy Johnson that Defendant suffered "from health
issues," and that she normally has "regular, even daily contact with
Defendant," but that she "had not been able to reach Defendant for days."
R314. The court found that "Defendant's neighbors [had] informed Deputy
Johnson they had not see[n] [D]efendant for a few days." R314.

-8-
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The court also found that Deputy Johnson had conducted welfare
checks previously "under the same types of circumstances," and " [o]n those
occasions he had discovered people in their homes that were deceased or
incapacitated." R314. And, the court found that here, Deputy Johnson
"observed signs suggesting that someone was home; but no one responded
to his knock or caiis into the home." R314. Finaiiy, the court found that
Deputy Johnson "relayed this information to Defendant's mother who was
adamant that her son may be in need of medical help." R314.
The court concluded that "[v]iewing these circumstances objectively,
and as a whole, it was reasonable for Deputy Johnson to conclude there was
an emergency and that [D]efendant was in immediate need of life-saving
assistance." R314. Finally, the court found that once Deputy Johnson
entered the home, he looked only "in places where an incapacitated person
could be found." R314. Thus, both "the search entry" -through the open
window - and the "search were reasonable and lawful under the
circumstances." R314. Consequently, "Deputy Johnson's observations of
[the 1narijuana plants] was lawful," and there was a valid basis "to conclude
that probable cause existed for authorization of a search warrant."R314.

Conviction, Sentence, and Appeal.

Defendant entered conditional

guilty pleas to production of a conh·olled substance and possession of a

-9-
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controlled substance with intent to distribute, both second degree felonies,
reserving his right to appeal the trial court's suppression ruling. R335-340.
As part of a plea agreement, the State dismissed the remaining three
charges. R336. The trial court then sentenced Defendant to two suspended
prison terms of 1-15 years and placed Defendant on Intense Bench
Probation for 36 months. R350.
Defendant timely appealed. R352-353.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that Deputy Johnson's warrantless entry into his
home violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and that the trial court thus
erred when it denied his motion to suppress the fruit of that entry.
Specifically, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the
emergency aid doctrine applied, asserting that Deputy Johnson did not
have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed.
Defendant's claim lacks merit.
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's right to be secure in
his home against unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the Fourth
A1nendment, warrantless entries into private homes are presumed
unreasonable. But that presumption is rebutted if exigent circumstances
reasonably support the entry.

-10-
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One such exigent circumstance is defined by the emergency aid
doctrine. In Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, 994 P.2d 1283, this
Court articulated a three-part test which conditioned e1nergency aid entries
on the presence of life-threatening injuries and the absence of improper
police motive. But in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), the United
States Supreme Court rejected that test, holding that an officer can make a
warrantless entry into a person's home so long as he has an objectively
reasonable basis to believe that a person within the house is in need of
immediate aid.
Here, the record supports the trial court's ruling that Deputy
Johnson's entry into Defendant's home was justified under the emergency
aid doctrine. Defendant's mother requested a welfare check on her 65-yearold son because she had not heard from him in several days and he was in
poor health. When Deputy Johnson arrived at Defendant's home to conduct
the check, he saw signs that someone was home, but no one answered the
door. And the neighbors had not seen Defendant for days. These
circumstances provided Deputy Johnson with an objectively reasonable
basis to believe that Defendant was in need of aid. Thus, the trial court
correctly ruled that Deputy Johnson's warrantless entry was lawful under
the emergency aid doctrine.

-11-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT

I.
DEPUTY JOHNSON'S WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO DEFENDANT'S
HOME WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE EMERGENCY AID DOCTRINE

Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it relied on the
emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to
uphold Deputy Johnson's warrantless entry into his house. Br. Aplt. 15.
Defendant argues that the emergency aid exception does not apply because
Deputy Johnson did not have an "objectively reasonable basis to believe
that an emergency existed or that there was an immediate need for
assistance for the protection of life." Br. Aplt. 13. Thus, Defendant argues,
Deputy Johnson's enh-y violated the Fourth Amendment, and the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of that entry. Br. Aplt. 19.
Defendant's claim lacks merit.
~-

A. Emergency aid entries are governed by the test articulated in
Brigham City v. Stuart, which abrogated the test adopted in
Salt Lake City v. Davidson.

The "touchstone of ... the Fourth Amendment" is reasonableness.

Pennsylvania v. Mirnms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109 (1977).

Under the Fourth

Amendment, a warrantless search inside a home is presumptively
um easonable. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (quoting Payton v.
1

New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). But that presumption is not absolute. In

some cases, "the exigencies of the situations [may] make the needs of law
-12-
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enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively
reasonable." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-394 (1978)(quotations
omitted). The United States Supreme Court has identified several
circumstances that justify warrantless searches or entries under the "exigent
circumstances" exception. Such circumstances include when police enter a
home while in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect, United States v. Santana,
427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976); when police enter a home to prevent the imminent
destruction of evidence, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39-40 (1963); or when
police search the home of an arrestee for persons "posing a danger to those
on the arrest scene." Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (protective
sweep).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the need to render
emergency aid as another exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless
entry or search. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2009). The
emergency aid doctrine allows police officers warrantless entry into a home
to render "emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an
occupant from imminent injury." Id. This exception recognizes that an
officer's role extends beyond that of a crime fighter into one of a community
caretaker-conducting "preventative patrols," aiding "individuals who are
in danger of physical harm," "creat[ing] and 1naintain[ing] a feeling of

-13-
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security in the community," and "provid[ing] other services on an
emergency basis." 3 Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment §6.6 (5th ed.) (citation omitted); see also United States v.

Coccia, 446 F.3d 233 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing officers "are expected to aid
those in dish·ess, combat actual hazards, prevent potential hazards from
materializing and provide an infinite variety of services to preserve and
protect public safety" (quotation and citation omitted)); United States v.

King, 990 F.2d 1552 (10th Cir. 1993) (recognizing officers may legitimately
seize an individual "to ensure the safety of the public and/ or the
individual, regardless of any suspected criminal activity"). The exception
recognizes that when responding as a community caretaker, "the business
of policemen... is to act" quickly and "not to speculate" because "[p]eople
could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm
deliberation associated with the judicial process." Wayne v. United States, 318
F.2d 205,212 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
In asserting that the trial court erred in applying the emergency aid
doctrine here, Defendant cites Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,
994 P.2d 1283, for the applicable test. Br. Aplt. 10-11. In Davidson, this Court
held that a warrantless search is "lawful under the emergency aid doctrine"
if

the following three-part test is met: "(1) police have an objectively

-14-
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reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exists and believe there is an
immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life";

11

(2) [t]he

search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence";
11

and (3) [t]here is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the
area or place to be searched." 2000 UT App 12, ,Iif12-13.

Defendant's

reliance on Davidson is misplaced.
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the three-part Davidson test in

Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13,

,r

23, 122 P.3d 506 ( Stuart"). But the
11

United States Supreme Court rejected that test on certiorari. Brigham City,
II

547 U.S. 398. The high Court held that a warrantless entry to render
II

emergency assistance" is justified so long as officers have an objectively
II

reasonable basis'' to believe that a person is seriously injured or threatened
with such injury" inside the house. 547 U.S. at 403, 406; accord Fisher, 558
U.S. at 47. In so holding, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected
II

Utah's motivation and protection of life" requirements.
II

The Supreme Court noted that it has repeatedly rejected" a test that
examines officer motivation. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404; see also United

States v. Najar. 451 F.3d 710, 718 (2006) (recognizing Brigham Cih/s rejection
II

of the motivation requirement). It explained that an action is 'reasonable'
under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of

-15-
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mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action."'

Id. at 404-405 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)
(brackets in original). Simply put, an "officer's subjective motivation is
irrelevant." Id. at 404.
The Supreme Court also rejected Utah's strict "protection of life"
requirement, holding that "[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment" requires
police officers to wait until someone is '"unconscious' or 'semi-conscious' or
worse before entering." Id. at 406. As explained in Michigan v. Fisher,
" [o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of 'a likely serious, life-threatening'
injury to invoke the emergency aid exception." 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009).
Indeed, "[t]he only injury police could confirm in Brigham City was the
bloody lip they saw the juvenile inflict upon the adult." Id. Indeed, the "role
of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not
simply rendering first aid to casualties; an officer is not like a boxing (or
hockey) referee, poised to stop a bout only if it becomes too one-sided."

Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406; accord State v. Anderson, 2015 UT 90, if if 22, 24,
362 P.3d 1232 (recognizing that previous "life or limb" standard abrogated
by Brigham City and Fisher).
This Court in Davidson held that an officer's belief that emergency
assistance is needed "must approxilnate probable cause." 2000 UT App 12,

-16-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

if15. But that holding too is incorrect. Brigham City did not require belief
akin to probable cause for officers to enter a house under the emergency aid
doch·ine. Id. at 406. As noted, all that the Court required is "an objectively

reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or
im1ninently tlu·eatened with such injury." Id. at 400 (emphasis added). This
proximates the reasonable suspicion standard applied by the United States
Supreme Court in other cases involving safety concerns. See, e.g., Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that "the issue is whether a reasonably
prudent [person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger"); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1050 (1983) (same); Maryland v. Buie, 494

u.s.· 325, 336 (1990)

(holding that

protective sweep must be "justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene"). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agrees. See United States v.

Gordon, 741 F.3d 64, 70 (10th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that "[o]fficers do not
need probable cause if they face exigent circumstances in an emergency" aid
situation); United States v. Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir.2008)
(holding that e1nergency aid doctrine's reasonable belief standard "is more
lenient than ... probable cause."); Najar, 451 F.3d at 718 (observing that
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Brigham City did not require "probable cause in this type of exigent
circun1stances").
B.

Given the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Johnson had
an objectively reasonable basis for believing that Defendant
was in need of emergency assistance.

As with reasonableness in any other search case, whether an officer's
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circu1nstances known at the time- guided by the realities of the situation
presented by the record from the viewpoint of prudent, cautious and
h·ained officers." _Najar, 451 F.3d at 718 (quotation and citation omitted); see

Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406 (holding that officer's emergency aid entry
depends on "the circu1nstances, viewed objectively") (quoting Scott v.

United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,
1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (determination of exigency based on totality of
the circumstances"); The reasonableness of the officer's belief should not be
viewed in "hindsight." Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49. All that is required is that the
officer has "' an objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical
assistance was needed, or persons were in danger."' Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49

(quoting Brigham. City, 547 U.S. at 406, Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394). Thus, even
though a non-exigent reason may exist, that alone is insufficient to render
an officer's belief um·easonable. See Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 ("Only when an
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apparent threat has become an actual harm can officers rule out innocuous
explanations for ominous circumstances.").
Deputy Johnson's concern here that Defendant needed immediate
assistance was objectively reasonable. Deputy Johnson, "guided by the
realities of the situation," acted as any prudent, cautious, trained officer
would in these circumstances. Najar, 451 F.3d at 718. Deputy Johnson knew
that Defendant was in his mid-sixties and in poor health. R357:15-17. He
also knew that no one had seen or heard from him in three days - which
was unusual because Defendant spoke to his mother "almost daily." R356:
34-35, 37; R357:15-17. Deputy Johnson observed signs that someone was
home, yet no one responded to his knocks or calls into the house., and
Defendant's mother was adamant that Defendant might need medical
assistance. R356:35-37; R314. In Deputy Johnson's experience, similar
situations led to finding individuals who were unconscious or dead.
R356:47.
With this perspective and these facts, Deputy Johnson's belief was
objectively reasonable that Defendant was inside his home in need of
medical assistance. Cf Anderson, 2015 UT 90, if,I28-29 (officer's belief
reasonable that 1notorist may need assistance where motorist pulled over
with e1nergency hazard lights on, on a very cold night in late December)
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Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 (officer responding to 911 call saw blood drops on
truck in driveway and reasonably believed emergency occurring); United

States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1039-1040 (9th Cir. 2006) (entry into apartment
reasonable where 911 call described domestic violence but no person
responded at home); State v. Vallasenor-Meza, 2005 UT App 65, iJ19, 108 P.3d
123 (officers reasonably believed, based on 911 call from victim's brother,
that victim was potentially injured and that immediate intervention was
necessary).
Defendant contends, however, that Deputy Johnson had

no

reasonable basis to enter because he "did not observe Defendant lying on
the floor inside" the house, "nor was there any indication" of "distress or
foul play." Br. Aplt. 14. But "[r]easonable belief does not require absolute
certainty." Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d at 1225. And for good reason. Limiting
the exception to only when an officer actually sees an injury, distress, or foul
play would hamstring law enforcement's ability to protect and serve- as
persons who need help are often not in a place where they can be seen. See

e.g., State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (little girl hidden
in defendant's balcony closet, naked and bound with tape); People v.

Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. App. 1976) (abrogated by
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Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 402) (missing hotel maid found dead, hidden in
laundry bask~t inside defendant's hotel room closet).
Furthermore, Deputy Johnson was not required to exhaust all
possibilities before looking for Defendant inside the home, as "ironclad
proof" of "a likely serious, life-threatening" injury is not necessary to invoke
the emergency aid exception. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49. (quotation omitted);

Anderson, 2015 U.T. 90 at ,129 (even though motorist may have had a
mundane reason for pulling over, officer "would have reason to be
concerned and to at least stop to determine whether assistance is needed.");

see also Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212 (police must act swiftly in emergency aid
situations, as "people could well die in emergencies" if officers act too
deliberately). As stated, all that is required is "' an objectively reasonable
basis for believing' that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in
danger." Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406). And
here the circumstances indicated that Defendant was potentially in need of
medical assistance and that immediate intervention was necessary. See

Najar, 451 F.3d at 716-17, 720 (warrantless entry reasonable where someone
at Najar's address called 911, hung-up, and dispatch was then unable to
reconnect); Anderson, 2015 UT 90, if 28 (officer's belief reasonable given the
seriousness of the perceived emergency).
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In sum, Officer Johnson's entry into the home to check on
Defendant's welfare was objectively reasonable. The trial court therefore
correctly ruled that the officer's entry into Defendant's home and his
subsequent search was reasonable under the e1nergency aid doctrine.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on March 11, 2016.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

LlNDSEYWELER
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addendum

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF KANE
76 North Main Street, Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone (435) 644-4923 Facsimile (435) 644-2052

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

v.
TIMOTHY JOSHEPH ADAMS,
Defendant.

Case No. 131600036
Judge Marvin D. Bagley

Submitted for decision are an Amended Motion to Suppress and a Motion to Quash
Search Warrants Issued March 12, 2013 and March 13, 2013. The Motions were filed by
defendant Timothy Joseph Adams and have been fully briefed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 2, 2013, defendant's mother, Lynn Clark called Kane County Dispatch
requesting that an officer check on her son at his home in Big Water, Utah. Ms. Clark reported
she had not heard from her son in three days, that he has ongoing health issues, and that she was
very worded. In response, Kane County Dispatch contacted Marshall Russell Johnson of the Big
Water Marshall's Office and informed him of the request for a welfare check. Because Marshall
Johnson was leaving town at the time, he asked Dispatch to contact Deputy Rob Johnson of the
Kane County Sheriffs Office and ask him to perform the welfare check.
Kane County Dispatch then contacted Deputy Rob Johnson and informed him of the
request; and the reasons for the request. Deputy Johnson had previously regularly performed
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welfare checks of the same nature and circumstances. Under such circumstances Deputy
Johnson had in the past found individuals in their home either dead or incapacitated.
Deputy Johnson proceeded to Defendant's home to perform the welfare check. He
knocked on the door but no one answered. He found evidence around the home suggesting
someone had recently been repairing leaky pipes under the home and working on top of the
house. There was an extension cord that powered a light nmning from an open window to a
crawl space under the home. There were tools on top of the roof near an air conditioning unit
and the area near the crawl space was moist. Deputy Johnson yelled into the home but no one
answered. Defendant's neighbors told Deputy Johnson they had not seen the defendant for two
or three days. Deputy Johnson observed there was a light on in the living room but he could not
see anything in the home from outside. Deputy Johnson called defendant's mother to discuss the
situation with her. Defendant's mother relayed her previous concerns about her son to Deputy
Johnson and asked him to "use whatever means necessary" to enter the home to ascertain if her
son was okay.
Deputy Johnson entered the home using the open living room window. Upon entering,
Deputy Johnson immediately saw what he described as a "grow plant, a light plant to grow
vegetation of sorts." There were several small plants of that he recognized to be marijuana. He
took a picture of the plants on his cell phone. Deputy Johnson looked around the home in places
defendant might have been; but could not locate him and left.
Approximately a week later, defendant was seen in his front yard. On March 12, 2013,
Marshall Russell Johnson filed an affidavit and obtained a search warrant to search defendant's
1"1
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home for the marijuana plants. On March 12, 2013 Marshall Johnson, Deputy Johnson and
others executed the search warrant. Upon arriving at defendant's home, Deputy Johnson
observed defendant standing by his Red Ford truck parked in front of the home on the side of the
road. Defendant was texting on his phone. The driver side door of the truck was open. As
Deputy Johnson approached the truck he could see several potted plants that appeared to be
marijuana on the passenger floor of the truck.
Deputy Johnson handed the issued search warrant to defendant and said, "I guess you
know what this is about." Defendant responded with, "Yeah, I do.'' Deputy Johnson then asked.
"Is there still any left in the house?" Defendant responded to the effect that there might be one
or two plants.
Officers then searched the home. Inside, they found several individually potted plants
that appeared to be marijuana, several items of drug paraphernalia, heat lamps, and industrial
lights. Officers also found a loaded .22 caliber rifle. The search ceased. The next day on March
13, 2013, Marshall Johnson obtained a second search warrant for Defendant's vehicle; and to
seize the gun and defendant's cell phone.
ANALYSIS

A search is unreasonable, and therefore, unconstitutional, when there is a warrantless
government intrusion into a reasonable expectation of privacy; unless there is an exception to the
warrant requirement. The Utah Court of Appeals recognized one such exception in Saft Lake
City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, 112-13, 994 P.2d 1283. The exception is known as the
"emergency aid doctrine." The test for applying the emergency aid doctrine is satisfied when:
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(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exists
and believe there is an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of
life.
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area or
place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area to be
searched and the emergency.

Id. at ~12. Another such exception is the "plain view" doctrine. "A seizure is valid under the
plain view doctrine if(l) the officer is lawfully present, (2) the item is in plain view, and (3) the
item is clearly incriminating." State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, ~22, 996 P.2d 555 (quoting

State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352,357 (Utah Ct.App.1998)).
Defendant claims Deputy Johnson never had the constitutional right to go inside his
home. As such defendant asserts in his motions that the probable cause information relied upon
for issuance of the first warrant was obtained illegally. Defendant also asserts the improperly
obtained information not only invalidates the first warrant, but the second search warrant as well.
He claims the information used to support the issuance of the second warrant was fruits of the
improperly obtained first warrant. Defendant claims all evidence obtained as a result of Deputy
Johnson's initial entry into defendant's home should be suppressed; and that the searches made
pursuant to the first and second warrants should be quashed.
In response, the State argues that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement
supports a finding that Deputy Johnson's entry into defendant's home was lawful. The State also
asserts that the plain view doctrine supports upholding the second search warrant.
This Court is persuaded the facts surrounding Deputy Johnson's initial entry into
defendant's home satisfies the legal requirements to invoke the emergency aid exception to the
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requirement that a warrant be obtained. Deputy Johnson spoke with defendant's mother who had
regular, even daily contact with Defendant. Defendant's mother communicated she had not been
able to reach defendant for days. She informed he was suffering with health issues. Defendant's
mother was very concerned and relayed this information to Deputy Johnson. Defendant's
neighbors informed Deputy Johnson they had not seed defendant for a few days. Deputy
Johnson had previously regularly conducted welfare checks under the same types of
circumstances. On those occasions he had discovered people in their homes that were deceased
or incapacitated. Deputy Johnson observed signs suggesting that someone was home; but no one
responded to his knock or calls into the home. Deputy Johnson relayed this information to
Defendant's mother who was adamant that her son may be in need of medical help.
Viewing these circumstances objectively, and as a whole, it was reasonable for Deputy
Johnson to conclude there was an emergency and that defendant was in immediate need of lifesaving assistance. None of the circumstances indicate Deputy Johnson was motivated by intent
to arrest or seize evidence. Deputy Johnson entered into the home through the living room
window, where a light could be seen, and where an incapacitated person might have been. Once
inside, Deputy Johnson observed what appeared to be marijuana growing in plain view. Deputy
Johnson only looked for Defendant in places where an incapacitated person could be found. The
entry and search were reasonable and lawful under the circwnstances. Consequently, Deputy

Johnson's observation of the alleged grow was a lawful and valid basis on which to conclude that
probable cause existed for authorization of a search warrant.
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Based on the above analysis, the second search warrant was not issued using fruit
obtained from a poisonous tree. The second warrant was issued based on Deputy Johnson's
observations while conducting the first search. Because of the first search warrant, Deputy
Johnson was lawfully at and inside defendant's home. The gun, cell phone, and alieged
marijuana in Defendant's truck were in plain view at that time. The items were incriminating
given that defendant was apparently in possession of a firearm while possessing a certain amount
of suspected controlled substances. In addition there were facts suggesting defendant was about
to transport what appeared to be marijuana; and was using his cell phone. The Court is
convinced the plain view exception applies to Deputy Johnson's observations while he was
executing the first search warrant. As a result the second search warrant should not be quashed.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence and
defendant's Motion to Quash Search Warrants Issued March 12, 2013 and March 13, 2013 are
DENlED.

Dated this

·o~day,,of2014,
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Marvin D. Bagley
District Court Judge
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